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Although a strict reading of the federal diversity statute seems to per-
mit a federal district court to hear any matter so long as the statutory re-
quirements are met,2 federal courts have consistently refused to hear cases
in certain areas.' A widely stated generalization is that federal courts may
not hear "probate matters."4 But an examination of the cases indicates that
the limitation is not as straightforward as it might appear, for federal courts
frequently become involved in cases which touch upon probate matters.
Hamilton v. Nielsen' involved the estate of a testator who died in 1972.
His will named coexecutors for the estate, which was valued at approxi-
mately $2.5 million.6 The coexecutors were directed to pay the residue of
the estate into a trust to be administered by a bank for the benefit of the
testator's children. In 1977, the plaintiff, one of Hamilton's children, filed a
diversity suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, charging the coexecutors with a breach of their duty to manage the
1. 678 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) provides, in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different
States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section
1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States.
3. Some of these exceptions to diversity jurisdiction are provided by statute.
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976) prevents a federal court from exercising juris-
diction if a party is improperly or collusively joined. Federal courts also may not
entertain an in rem action if the property is already in the hands of a state court.
See Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); Key v.
Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1059 (5th Cir. 1980). An important area in which the federal
courts will not act, even though diversity is present, is domestic relations. See Ohio
ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 595-96
(1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 186 (1858).
4. A count taken in 1956 indicated that statements to this effect had been
made in approximately 250 reported federal cases. Vestal & Foster, Implied Limita-
tions on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1956).
5. 678 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982).
6. Id at 710.
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estate skillfully. 7 The district court reached the merits of the case, conclud-
ing that the coexecutors had not breached their duty.8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after determining that it had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, affirmed the finding as to liability but vacated and
remanded in part.
9
The court of appeals conceded that neither it nor the district court had
the power to probate wills or interfere with probate proceedings but con-
cluded that the district court had not exercised either power since the plain-
tiff was merely seeking money damages from the coexecutors.'o Hamilton is
one of the most recent cases in which a federal court has reaffirmed the
proposition that it may not entertain purely probate matters while recog-
nizing that it had the power to entertain actions "related to probate.""1
The reluctance of federal courts to hear probate matters is based on the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the equity jurisdiction
granted to federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789.12 According to the
Court, the Act conferred upon federal courts the equity jurisdiction pos-
sessed by the High Court of Chancery in England in 1789.13 The current
7. Hamilton v. Nielsen, 513 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affidas to liability,
vacatedon other grounds, 678 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff charged that the
coexecutors were negligent in exercising an option to buy additional shares of stock
and in failing to sell stock in 1972 while the price remained high. 513 F. Supp. at
208.
8. 513 F. Supp. at 208. The court noted that the only culprit in the case was
the stock market and that the plaintiff had not shown that the actions of the coexec-
utors were careless in light of the facts and circumstances at the time. Id.
9. 678 F.2d at 715. The issue was whether the executors were entitled to have
their attorneys' fees paid by the plaintiff. The court of appeals remanded the case
to the district court to make a determination as to whether the Illinois courts would
tax attorneys' fees in cases similar to this one. Id.
10. Id at 710.
11. The Seventh Circuit has considered the probate exception in one case since
Hamilton. In Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982), the plaintiffs, relatives
of the decedent, sought to have the defendants declared constructive trustees of the
estate. The plaintiffs contended that the decedent was improperly influenced to
bequeath his entire estate to the defendants. The district court dismissed the diver-
sity suit. In affirming the decision of the district court, the court of appeals referred
to the probate exception as "one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of the
law of federal jurisdiction." Id. at 713. Although the court criticized the reasoning
behind the probate exception, it noted that the exception was too established in the
federal system to be lightly discarded. Id.
12. Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
13. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Waterman v. Canal-
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 425, 430 (1869). See also Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 475 (7th
Cir. 1979); Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Starr v.
Rupp, 421 F.2d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1970).
1983]
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diversity statute has been similarly interpreted, 4 even though it speaks in
terms of "all civil actions,"' 5 as opposed to the original Act's "suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity."' 6 Thus, in order to understand the
probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, it is necessary to under-
stand the limitations placed on the High Court of Chancery in 1789.
Chancery did not have jurisdiction to grant or deny probate of wills of
personal property, to appoint or remove executors and administrators, or to
grant divorces or annulments.' 7 These matters were within the jurisdiction
of the English ecclesiastical courts. The ecclesiastical courts had exclusive
jurisdiction only over the probate of a will involving purely personal prop-
erty; a will involving real property could be proved in an ejectment action
in the Court of Common Pleas or in a suit in Chancery.' 8 Probate proceed-
ings in the ecclesiastical courts were in rem and proceeded according to the
Roman civil law. A grant of probate bound everyone claiming personal
property of the decedent. Proof of a will at common law or in equity, on
the other hand, was an in personam proceeding, which bound only the par-
ties and their privies. In 1789, the ecclesiastical courts had concurrent juris-
diction with the High Court of Chancery over proceedings to compel an
executor or administrator to account for maladministration.' 9 Since federal
courts have that equity jurisdiction possessed by the High Court of Chan-
cery in 1789, and since pure probate matters were outside the jurisdiction of
Chancery at that time, federal courts have held that pure probate matters
are outside their jurisdiction.
14. See cases cited note 13 supra; see also Jackson v. United States Nat'l Bank,
153 F. Supp. 104, 107-08 (D.,Or. 1957).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The pertinent provisions
of that section are as follows:
[The] circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen of
the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.
The pertinent provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) are set out at note 2 supra.
17. See Allen v. M'Pherson, I H.L.C. 191, 191, 9 Eng. Rep. 727, 728 (1847). See
generally Barnesly v. Powel, I Ves. Sen. 284, 27 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1749); Kerrich v.
Bransby, 7 Brown P.C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. 284 (H.L. 1727); J. FONBLANQUE, A TREA-
TISE OF EQUITY (A. Lausat 4th ed. 1835).
18. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625-30 (7th ed. 1956);
R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 136 (1940). See also J. FONBLANQUE, Supra
note 17, at 564; J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECUTORS AND AD-
MINISTRATORS § 10 (2d ed. 1889); Comment, Federal Court Probate Proceedings, 45
IND. L.J. 387, 387 n.1 (1970).
19. Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10, §§ 1, 2 (1670); 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 18, at 629; 3 id. at 556-61 (5th ed. 1942); 5 id at 288-89, 316-20
(3d ed. 1945); 6 id at 652-57 (2d ed. 1937).
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Various other reasons also have been advanced in support of this judi-
cially created probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. First, since
a probate proceeding is in rem, a federal court cannot interfere with the
state court proceeding while the state court has control of the property
which is the subject of the lawsuit.2 ° Second, probate is merely a require-
ment to make a will effective, and since the authority to make wills is de-
rived from the states, probate matters are outside the scope of federal
jurisdiction.2' Third, there is a strong state interest in probate which is
reflected in the expertise of state courts in this area. 22 Fourth, probate mat-
ters are not "cases or controversies" within the meaning of Article III of the
United States Constitution.23 Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the ex-
20. See, e.g., Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (federal court is not to
disturb or affect possession of property in custody of state court but may adjudicate
rights in such property); Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S.
456, 466 (1939) (district court without jurisdiction where state court already ad-
ministering trust when subsequent federal action alleging mismanagement filed);
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477 (1936) (even
where district court acquires jurisdiction prior to state proceedings, circumstances
may still require dismissal); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215
U.S. 33, 44 (1909) (federal court cannot seize and control property in possession of
state court); Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 614 (1893) (administrator appointed
by state court is officer of that court; his possession of decedent's property cannot be
disturbed by any other court); Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 600 (1887) (equity
jurisdiction of federal court subject only to limitation that court cannot seize prop-
erty in custody of state court); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 180 (1884) (princi-
ple that federal court may not take control of property while in custody of state
court applies to both writs of attachment and executions upon judgments); Gaines
v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1875) (although federal courts have no jurisdiction
over probate matters since probate proceedings are in rem, federal court may enter-
tain suit between parties involving the validity or construction of a will); In re Brod-
erick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874) (court of equity will not entertain
suit to set aside a will or the probate thereof since all persons are bound by decision
of court having jurisdiction); Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.
1972) (federal courts will not entertain disputes incidental or ancillary to in rem
administration or estate in state probate custody); Day v. Wilson, 286 F.2d 274, 276
(10th Cir. 1961) (exercise of jurisdiction to enforce claim against personal property
proper where federal court had in rem jurisdiction over property); Robinson v.
Georgia Savings Bank and Trust Co., 106 F.2d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 1939) (federal
court may not interfere with administrator's possession of estate assets; it may deter-
mine, but not enforce, claims against the estate).
21. See Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 205 (1918); Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S.
89, 110 (1905).
22. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1979)
(scope of probate exception does not necessarily define area in which exercise of
federal jurisdiction is appropriate); Bassler v. Arrowood, 500 F.2d 138, 142 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1116 (1975) (state courts have developed an expertise in
probate matters which should discourage federal court intervention).
23. See Galleher v. Grant, 160 F. Supp. 88, 94 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
1983]
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ception is easier to state than to administer.2 4 The principal reason for this
is that once it is decided that a matter is merely "related to probate," and
not "purely probate," a federal court must weigh numerous factors in deter-
mining whether it should exercise its jurisdiction in the particular case.
It is well settled that federal courts may neither probate wills nor ad-
minister estates, since these are pure probate matters.2 5 Beyond this, it is
difficult to distinguish between matters related to probate and those that
are purely probate. For example, the rules are not absolute as to whether a
federal court may annul or set aside the probate of a will.26 A federal court
may, however, order an accounting of an estate, provided that the account-
ing does not look solely to distribution of that estate.27 In addition, it is
generally held that a federal court may not order a distribution of property
that is in custody of a state court. 28 Finally, although a federal court may
exercise jurisdiction over proper actions before a final judgment is made in
state probate proceedings, 29 the federal court judgment must be presented
24. Professor Wright has noted that "[t]he exception from the diversity juris-
diction as to probate matters is far from absolute . . . . [It] turns . . . on unclear
distinctions of the utmost subtlety." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 25, at 98 (3d ed. 1976).
25. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Sutton v. English, 246 U.S.
199, 205 (1918); Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 619 (1893); In re Broderick's Will,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1875); Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th
Cir. 1979); Bassler v. Arrowood, 500 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1974); Starr v. Rupp,
421 F.2d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1970); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
350 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1965); Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge,
322 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1963).
26. Apparently, the state practice is controlling in this area. If the state, by
statute or custom, permits an independent action for this purpose, the federal court
may also entertain the action. Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 205 (1918). In
Ledbetter v. Taylor, 359 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1966), the court considered whether
the federal district court had jurisdiction to declare a certain assignment of real
property void. In affirming the dismissal of the action, the court noted that the
judgment was supported by local law and policy. Id at 762.
27. See Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 45
(1909) (accounting can only be had in probate court having jurisdiction of matter);
In re McDonald's Estate, 42 F.2d 266, 269 (D. Minn. 1930) (federal court has no
power to adjust account of administrator). Cf Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
425, 431 (1869) (court has jurisdiction to compel executors and administrators to
account).
28. See Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 614 (1893). The conclusion that fed-
eral courts may not order the distribution of property which is in the custody of a
state court follows from the rule that federal courts may not disturb or affect posses-
sion of property in the custody of a state court. See cases cited note 20 supra.
29. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1946) (suit by Alien Property
Custodian to determine Custodian's asserted right to share in decedent's estate
which was being administered in state probate court); Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S.
335, 336-37 (1908) (suit in federal court to subject certain interests in decedent's
[Vol. 48
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to the probate court for payment where the probate court already has con-
trol of the property which will be used to satisfy the judgment.3 ° While the
holdings in these recurring situations have been fairly uniform, it often is
difficult to apply the rules to new situations.
In Markham v. Allen, 3 1 the Supreme Court stated the general rule that
although a federal court may not probate a will or administer an estate, it
does have equity jurisdiction to entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees,
heirs, and other claimants to establish their claims against an estate.32 The
Court noted, however, that this is true only to the extent that the federal
court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or take control of
property in custody of a state court.33 Thus, once it is established that the
subject matter of the lawsuit does not involve a purely probate matter, the
question becomes whether the federal court's action will interfere with the
state court proceeding. Federal courts have developed certain tests to deter-
mine whether interference will result if the federal court hears the probate
matter.
estate to a lien); Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 216 (1892) (suit to charge dece-
dent's administrator with amount of federal court judgment against him); Clark v.
Bever, 139 U.S. 96, 100 (1891) (suit against decedent's administrator to recover
amount unpaid for stocks); Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 74 (1885) (federal court
may not remand case which had been removed to federal court to avoid prejudice
of state court against citizen of another state); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425,
426 (1868) (suit to establish plaintiff's right to distributive share in decedent's es-
tate); Foster v. Carlin, 200 F.2d 943, 944-45 (4th Cir. 1952) (suit asking that trust be
declared void, that settlement was vitiated by fraud, that deceased died intestate,
and that receiver be appointed for a corporation); Rosenberg v. Baum, 153 F.2d 10,
12 (10th Cir. 1946) (suit in federal court while state probate proceeding pending to
impress a trust upon certain real estate and to have accounting of estate); O'Connor
v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1927) (suit to have plaintiffs declared heirs at
law of decedent and to have title quieted in them as against administrator; federal
court not to decide who was entitled to decedent's estate under will); Chase Nat'l
Bank v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948, 952 (lst Cir. 1926) (suit against executors and legatee
to enforce assignment within jurisdiction of federal court).
30. In Yonley v. Lavender, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 276 (1874), the court considered
the question whether a federal court can execute a judgment against the estate of a
decedent while the estate is being administered in state court. In answering the
question in the negative, the Supreme Court held it improper for a non-resident
holder of a federal court judgment to take precedence over resident creditors who
did not have the right to sue in federal court. Id. at 280. The proper procedure was
for the holder of the federal court judgment to present that judgment to the state
probate court for execution and payment. The federal court judgment gave no
prior lien on estate property but merely compelled the administrator to recognize
the judgment in the payment of debts. Id
31. 326 U.S. 490 (1946).
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The majority approach, first set out in Sutton v. English ,3" focuses on the
route the lawsuit would take if brought in the state court system.3 5 In Sut-
ton, the decedent's heirs brought an action in the district court and sought
an accounting, a decree setting aside a joint will, and partition of the dece-
dent's property.3 6 The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a state, by
statute or custom, grants parties the right to bring an action at law or a suit
in equity to annul a will or set aside probate, federal courts may enforce the
same remedy provided the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met.3 8
The Court noted, however, that this test applies only if the suit is independ-
ent of probate, not merely incidental or ancillary to it. 9 An important
issue in this context is the effect of a state statute that grants broader juris-
diction to the probate court than was possessed by the English ecclesiastical
courts in 1789. The question then becomes whether a federal court, under
the Sutton approach, is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely be-
cause the action, if brought in the state court system, could be heard only in
a specialized probate court as opposed to a state court of general jurisdic-
tion. Generally, the answer is no. Where the action is within the estab-
lished equity jurisdiction of a federal court (i.e., within the equity
jurisdiction of Chancery in 1789), the court may entertain the action even
though a state statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to a probate court.4 0
34. 246 U.S. 199 (1918).
35. See Bassler v. Arrowood, 500 F.2d 138, 142 (8th Cir. 1974) (if claim enforce-
able in state court of general jurisdiction, argument more persuasive for exercise of
federal jurisdiction); Ledbetter v. Taylor, 359 F.2d 760, 761 (10th Cir. 1966) (since
federal jurisdiction entirely derivative and state law unclear, district court properly
dismissed action); Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 1945) (under state
law, suit to set aside will and probate was independent and could be brought in
state court of ordinary jurisdiction, so federal jurisdiction properly invoked). See
a/So C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 25, at 99.
36. 246 U.S. at 203.
37. Id at 205. The appellants contended that the district court had original
jurisdiction on the ground that state courts of general jurisdiction could have enter-
tained the suit. Id
38. Id
39. Id The determination as to whether an action is incidental or ancillary to
state proceedings is made under state law. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 25, at 99
n.19.
40. See Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909):
The rule stated in many cases in this court affirms the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts to give relief of the nature stated, notwithstanding the
statutes of the state undertake to give to state probate courts exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters concerning the settlement of accounts of exec-
utors and administrators in the distribution of estates.
Id at 43-44. See also Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d 749,
754 (5th Cir. 1963) (federal jurisdiction cannot be defeated by state statute prescrib-
ing proper forum for the action).
[Vol. 48
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The minority approach looks to the nature of the plaintiffs claim, not
to the route it would take in state court.4 1 The question becomes whether
the federal court must pass on the validity of a will. For example, if the
action in federal court is based on a claim that the decedent's will is invalid,
the court would be required to rule upon the validity of a will, which is a
direct interference with probate.42 On the other hand, if the validity of the
will is admitted and the claim is based on an assertion that the plaintiff has
a right to share in the distribution, the federal court can decide the suit
without interfering with the state proceedings.4 3 The minority approach
originated in Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co. ," where the
plaintiff sued the decedent's estate, arguing that certain bequests to named
charities had lapsed because they did not exist as named and that he should
be entitled to those bequests as the decedent's heir.45 The plaintiff also
sought an accounting. The Court held that the power to require an ac-
counting was outside the scope of the district court's jurisdiction but found
that the federal court could determine the rights as between the parties
without interfering with the state proceedings.
4 6
One or the other of these approaches has been adopted by most federal
41. See Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussion
of minority approach). In Starr v. Rupp, 421 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1970), the court
purported to adopt the minority approach. Iad at 1007. But the case actually was
decided on the fact that Ohio had vested jurisdiction over the claim in its probate
court to the exclusion of the state courts of general jurisdiction. Thus, Starr was
really decided on the basis of the majority approach in that it looked to the route
the suit would have taken had it been brought in the state court system. Id at 1006.
42. In Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d 749, 754 (5th
Cir. 1963), the court noted that the suit was not one to annul a will and that, in
fact, the plaintiff had asserted the validity of the probated will. Thus, the court
held that the district court had improperly dismissed the suit. But in Mitchell v.
Nixon, 200 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1952), the court, in affirming the district court's dismis-
sal, noted that the action was not merely a dispute between parties who had ac-
cepted a will but a dispute as to its construction as well. The court characterized
the action as a defense to probate, a part of a proceeding in rem. Id. at 52.
43. See Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d 749, 754 (5th
Cir. 1963).
44. 215 U.S. 33 (1909).
45. Id at 41-42.
46. Id at 45. In support of this finding, the Waterman Court stated:
In view of the cases cited, and the rules thus established, it is evident that
the bill in this case goes too far in asking to have an accounting of the
estate . . . for it is the result of the cases that . . . the jurisdiction of the
probate court may not be interfered with. . . . Still, we think there is an
aspect of this case within the Federal jurisdiction, and for which relief may
be granted to the complainant . . ..
Id The court in Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 476 n.8 (7th Cir. 1979),
discussed the Waterman case and noted that federal jurisdiction was proper since the
plaintiff did not seek to set aside the validity of the probate of the will.
1983]
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courts, but at least one circuit has not expressed a preference for either the
majority or minority approach. The Seventh Circuit, which decided Hamil-
ton, recognizes both approaches as legitimate and refuses to declare either
test to be solely correct. Instead, it takes the position that both are merely
guidelines to aid in resolving the question whether a federal court should
entertain an action which is related to probate.
47
The jurisdictional issue is not settled by a finding that the federal court
would not interfere with a state action by taking the case. Even if a particu-
lar case meets the requirements of the majority or minority test, a federal
court will use abstention principles48 to determine if it should refrain from
hearing the case. The finding that a probate related case is within the juris-
diction of the district court only permits, but does not require, the court to
hear the case.4 9 The usual reasons advanced in support of abstention in
probate related cases are the expertise of state courts in probate matters"
and the strong interest of the states.5" As a result of abstention in probate
related cases, it is evident that not all federal courts agree on the scope of
the probate exception.
47. See Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1979):
We express no view at this time as to whether either or both approaches
should be used by the district court on remand, or whether an entirely
new test should be devised. The approaches outlined above are not hard
and fast rules; rather they were formulated to aid in the resolution of the
difficult jurisdictional issue presented when probate-like actions are filed
in federal court.
The court also suggested that the district court consider reported cases with similar
facts. Id at 476 n.10.
48. "Abstention" is the term for the refusal of a federal court to exercise the
jurisdiction given it by statutes or the constitution. Professor Wright breaks absten-
tion down into four major categories. The second category, "to avoid needless con-
flict with the administration by a state of its own affairs," appears to encompass the
probate exception. C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 52, at 218.
49. Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1979).
50. See Bassler v. Arrowood, 500 F.2d 138, 142 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1116 (1975) (state courts deal with these problems daily and have developed
expertise which should discourage federal courts from intervening). In support of
this proposition, the court in Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.' 1979),
noted that "the scope of the probate exception does not necessarily define the area
in which the exercise of federal judicial power is appropriate." Id at 477.
51. In Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d
Cir. 1973), a case which involved the domestic relations exception to federal diver-
sity jurisdiction, the court said:
[T]here is particularly strong reason for abstention in cases which, though
not within the exceptions for matters of probate and administration or
matrimony and custody actions, are on the verge, since like those within
the exception, they raise issues "in which the states have an especially
strong interest and a well-developed competence for dealing with them."
Id at 516 (quoting C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 25, at 84 (2d ed. 1970)).
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Regardless of the historical origins of the probate exception, it is neces-
sary to determine whether it serves any useful function. Although it is diffi-
cult to counter the "strong state interest" argument,52 the assertion that
state courts have more expertise in probate matters is relatively weak. Fed-
eral judges sitting in diversity actions routinely apply state law. Federal
judges arguably are as capable in matters related to probate as their coun-
terparts in state courts of general jurisdiction. One court has noted that
federal courts have gained some experience in probate related matters due
to the increased use of will substitutes such as life insurance and joint bank
accounts.5" In addition, certification of difficult questions to the highest
state court is available in some cases to assist federal courts in the applica-
tion of state law to a particular question.
54
The promotion of legal certainty and judicial economy have also been
advanced as policy goals thought to be served by the probate exception.55
As to legal certainty, the belief is that there is less chance of a different
result if probate matters are limited to state courts.56 This argument is not
persuasive, since the Erie Doctrine 57 contemplates the same result without
52. One possible counter-argument, however, is that the state's interest should
give way to the individual's interest in a fair trial. One justification given for the
existence of the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts is the protection of an out-of-
state litigant from the state courts' alleged bias in favor of their own residents. See
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982) (possible bias of state court in
favor of its own citizens might frustrate decedent's intentions).
53. See id at 715 (diversity action to have plaintiffs declared constructive trust-
ees of decedent's estate).
54. A Florida statute, for example, provides:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when
it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit
court of appeals of the United States . . . that there are involved in any
proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of this state,
which are determinative of said cause, and there are no clear controlling
precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal
appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of
this state to the supreme court of this state for instructions concerning
such questions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme
court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1974). Missouri has no similar provision.
55. See Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982).
56. See id. at 714:
If an issue may end up being litigated in either a state or a federal court,
its resolution is less certain, less predictable, than if it can be litigated in
one or the other forum only, even if the same substantive law is applied.
Certainty is desirable in every area of the law but has been thought espe-
cially so with regard to the transfer of property at death.
57. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). UnderErie, a federal court,
although allowed to use its own procedural rules, must use state substantive law
when sitting in diversity actions. The use of state substantive law should result in
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regard to whether the action is heard in a federal or state forum, and there
is no reason to believe that it would not also work with probate matters. As
for judicial economy, the argument that efficiency is served by keeping pro-
bate matters in state courts is easily countered. Federal courts may be capa-
ble of even greater efficiency in probate matters since responsibility for
estate assets and liabilities could be placed in one forum in cases where the
assets are actually located in what would be several state probate
jurisdictions. 58
The probate exception has also been criticized on the ground that it is
based solely on English practice.59 The probate exception arose from the
jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical courts; America, this argument
goes, did not have an ecclesiastical court.6" It must be noted, however, that
some jurisdictions do have specialized probate courts for dealing with mat-
ters that once were handled exclusively by the English ecclesiastical
courts.6" It also is frequently the case, even in states which have vested
probate jurisdiction in courts of general jurisdiction, that probate matters
are assigned to a particular judge.62 Thus, it is arguable that the American
court system does have something akin to the English ecclesiastical courts.
Despite criticism of the probate exception, the doctrine continues to be
applied in federal courts. Although federal courts will entertain probate
related actions in proper cases, a plaintiff desiring a federal forum must
overcome numerous obstacles before it will be available. First, the jurisdic-
tional requirements must be met and it must be established that the action
does not involve a matter classified as pure probate. Second, the plaintiff
the federal court reaching the same result as the state court. See general' C.
WRIGHT, supra note 24, §§ 55-60.
58. See Comment, supra note 18, at 397:
This . . .consideration becomes important in several urban areas of the
country. A decedent who lived in New Jersey but operated a business in
New York City would otherwise be forced to invoke the jurisdiction of
several local probate courts in two states for final disposition of the estate.
A similar problem exists in Kansas City, Chicago, Louisville and other
cites [sic] located near state jurisdictional boundries [sic]. A federal court
could expand its jurisdiction through Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a) over state boun-
dry [sic] lines thereby dealing with the estate in one proceeding.
59. See Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. See id But, the court said, "However shoddy the historical underpinnings
of the probate exception, it is too well established .. . to be lightly discarded
61. In those jurisdictions that do have specialized probate courts, it is arguable
that the probate court is, in effect, akin to the English ecclesiastical court.
62. In Missouri, for example, probate matters are handled in the associate cir-
cuit court but are often assigned to a particular associate circuit judge. In Hamil-
ton v. Nielsen, 678 F.2d 709, 710 (7th Cir. 1982), the district court noted that
Illinois had abolished separate probate courts and had vested the probate jurisdic-
tion in its courts of general jurisdiction.
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must establish that, under state law, his action is neither incidental nor an-
cillary to probate. Third, it must be shown that no interference with state
proceedings will result if the federal court entertains the action. Fourth,
should the issue arise, the-plaintiff must be prepared to convince the federal
court that it should not abstain from hearing the case since a federal court
has the power to abstain from hearing matters which are merely related to
probate. Since there seems to be no present inclination to overrule the pro-
bate exception entirely, increased availability of the federal forum will re-
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